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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990886-CA 
v. : 
JACK JAMES TRANE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of cocaine, a third degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 1999). This 
Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
After defendant refused three times to submit to Officer Dobrowolski's orders 
to submit to a protective frisk, was his subsequent arrest justified because: (a) he 
lacked any right to resist a lawful order within the scope of Officer Dobrowolski's 
authority as a peace officer; and/or (b) there was probable cause to believe that 
defendant was publicly intoxicated? 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to these issues. The trial court's 
underlying fact findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." 
The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing 
some "measure of discretion" as regards the application of legal standards to the facts. 
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and not Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANN, § 76-8-305 (1999): 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful 
order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-16 (1999): 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may 
frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any 
other person is in danger. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-701(1) (1999): 
A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a 
controlled substance, or any substance having the property of releasing 
toxic vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, 
in a public place or in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other 
persons. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of controlled substance (cocaine), a third 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998); intoxication, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-701(1)( 1999); and 
interference with a peace officer making an arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305(2) (1999) (R. 17-19). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine seized incident to his arrest (R. 
42-49). A hearing on the motion was held on 2 March 1999, following which the motion 
was denied (R. 166:81-85). The trial court entered written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in support of its ruling on 21 June 1999 (R. 110-113) (a copy of the 
written ruling is contained in addendum A). 
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the third degree felony 
offense and the remaining charges were dismissed (R. 114-120) (a copy of the plea 
agreement is contained in addendum B). The trial court imposed an indeterminate term 
of from 0-5 years and various fines and fees (R. 123-125). The trial court then stayed the 
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sentence and placed defendant on a 36 month term of probation (id.). Defendant timely 
appealed (R. 126). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
At 4:15 a.m. on 26 November 1998, Officer Kent Bushman investigated a report of 
a male harassing customers and a clerk at the Circle K Store located at the intersection of 
700 East and 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 166:5, 16, 34). As Officer Bushman 
approached the Circle K, the clerk motioned toward defendant (R. 166:6). Officer 
Bushman smelled alcohol coming from defendant's person and also observed that 
defendant was behaving in a loud and tumultuous manner (R. 166:8,19-20, 22). 
Defendant refused to provide Officer Bushman with his identification, stating instead that 
it was the clerk that needed to be dealt with (R. 166:7). Defendant also "stood into a 
typical boxing stance, puffed his chest out, and just took a defensive posture similar to a 
boxer" (R. 166:8). Officer Bushman suspected defendant was disturbing the peace and/or 
was publicly intoxicated (id.). Defendant's angry and uncooperative behavior also caused 
Officer Bushman to be concerned for his safety (id.). In Officer Bushman's experience, 
intoxicated people are unpredictable and sometimes violent (R. 166:3-5). Officer 
Bushman thus called for backup (R. 166:9). 
^he facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying 
defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 
1997). 
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While waiting for backup, Officer Bushman again requested defendant's 
identification and explained that defendant was obligated to identify himself (R. 166:9). 
Thereafter, defendant pulled out his wallet and Utah identification card, but would not 
release his grip on the card when Officer Bushman reached for it (R. 166:9). Defendant 
only let go of the card after the officer ordered him to do so and also pulled it from 
defendant (R. 166:10,21). 
Officer Dobrowolski arrived just as Officer Bushman obtained defendant's 
identification (R. 166:10, 34, 47). Officer Bushman advised Officer Dobrowolski that 
defendant was being "less than cooperative" and/or "belligerent," and that he was going 
to run a warrants check (R. 166:11, 34-35, 47). Officer Bushman wanted Officer 
Dobrowolski to be aware of defendant's uncooperative behavior for purposes of safety: 
"I didn't want Officer Dobrowolski to step into something without any information, 
information that I had gathered from being there prior to, and just for Officer 
Dobrowolski's personal safety" (R. 166:11). Officer Dobrowolski asked if defendant had 
been frisked yet and Officer Bushman said, "No" (R. 166:34-35). Officer Dobrowolski 
was also concerned about safety based on the information from Officer Bushman and 
because defendant appeared intoxicated: "I thought that the two coupled made him a 
possible danger to myself and I wanted to ensure that he didn't have any weapons" (R. 
166:35). 
5 
Accordingly, as Officer Bushman returned to his patrol vehicle to run the warrants 
check, Officer Dobrowolski instructed defendant to put his hands on his head, interlock 
his fingers and turn away from the officer so that he could be searched (R. 166:11, 35). 
Defendant maintained his fighting stance and refused to comply (R. 166:11, 36). 
Concerned about defendant's uncooperative behavior, Officer Bushman turned around to 
observe the procedure (R. 166:11). Officer Dobrowolski repeated his request two more 
times and defendant continued to refuse physically and verbally: 
The first time I told him - and this is a memory but I'm sure if this is an 
exact quote, but he kind of backed up like this, held his arms away, and 
said, "That ain't happening, or something to that effect... it made me more 
concerned. I was concerned now at this point that he knew of my intention 
to search him and I was wondering if he had something he didn't want me 
to find that could hurt me. 
(R. 166:11-12,36,51). 
Because defendant continued to resist the protective frisk, Officer Bushman 
returned to assist Officer Dobrowolski (R. 166:11-12, 36-37). The officers then moved to 
arrest defendant for interference with a peace officer (R. 166:38). Specifically, Officer 
Dobrowolski took defendant's right arm and Officer Bushman took defendant's left arm 
(R. 166:12). Defendant forcibly resisted and a struggle ensued (R. 166:12). Ultimately, 
the trio ended up in the eastbound lands of 2700 South, approximately 10-12 feet from 
where the struggle began (R. 166:12, 39). The officers subdued defendant with OC spray 
before they successfully arrested him (R. 166:12-13, 53). Jail personnel searched 
defendant and located rock cocaine on his person (R. 45, 54). 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rock cocaine was seized from defendant's person during a search incident to his 
arrest on several misdemeanor charges including interference with a peace officer, and 
public intoxication. Pursuant to a plea bargain, these misdemeanor charges were 
dismissed in exchange for defendant's guilty plea to a felony drug charge for possession 
of cocaine. Defendant also reserved the right to challenge the validity of his arrest on the 
misdemeanor charges on appeal. 
Defendant Was Lawfully Arrested For Interference With a Peace Officer. 
An order to submit to a protective frisk is well within the scope of a peace officer's 
authority. Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, the attempted frisk here was ultimately 
not justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant was potentially dangerous, defendant 
lacked any right to resist the lawful order. Defendant's assertions to the contrary do not 
comport with either the law or the policy applicable to this situation. Defendant's arrest 
for interfering with the frisk, and the search incident to his arrest should accordingly be 
upheld. 
There Was Also Abundant Probable Cause to Arrest for Public Intoxication. 
Alternatively, however, even if Officer Dobrowolski acted outside the scope of his 
authority in ordering the protective frisk here, defendant's arrest was nonetheless valid on 
the ground that there was simultaneous probable cause to believe that he was publicly 
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intoxicated. The trial court's finding of probable cause to arrest for public intoxication is 
well supported and should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
OFFICER DOBROWOLSKI ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS 
AUTHORITY AS A PEACE OFFICER IN ORDERING 
DEFENDANT TO SUBMIT TO A PROTECTIVE FRISK; 
THEREFORE, DEFENDANT LACKED ANY RIGHT TO RESIST, 
EVEN ASSUMING THE OFFICER ULTIMATELY LACKED 
REASONABLE SUSPICION DEFENDANT WAS POTENTIALLY 
DANGEROUS2 
One of the charges dismissed in connection with defendant's plea bargain was 
interference with a peace officer (R. 114-120), add. B. In Point II of his brief, defendant 
challenges the legitimacy of his arrest for interference with an officer after he refused to 
submit to an alleged illegal frisk.3 Aplt. Br. at 24. Specifically, defendant claims that 
2Defendant only nominally relies on state constitutional provisions and articulates 
no meaningful argument for a different state constitutional analysis here. See Aplt. Br. at 
18. Neither the State, nor this Court need therefore address his claim of a state 
constitutional violation. See Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1006, n.l (Utah 
App.), cert denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 & n.5 
(Utah App. 1990) (requiring 'thoughtful and probing analysis" of state constitutional 
claims). 
3In Point I of his brief defendant concedes that any detention engendered by police 
questioning at the Circle K convenience store was reasonable, but disputes that Officer 
Dobrowolski reasonably suspected that he was armed or otherwise dangerous such that a 
protective frisk was also justified. Aplt. Br. at 18. For reasons set forth in the body of 
this point, the validity of the frisk is ultimately irrelevant and therefore the State does not 
respond to defendant's allegation in a separate point. In any event, in assessing the 
reasonableness of the decision to frisk, "it is not essential that the officer actually be in 
fear, United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976), nor need he be 
'absolutely certain that the individual is armed. The issue is whether a reasonably prudent 
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others 
8 
because the offense of interference with an officer requires the State to prove that Officer 
Dobrowolski issued a 'lawful order," the allegedly illegal attempt to frisk here precludes 
the State from establishing the requisite 'lawful" elements of the offense and requires that 
he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the dismissed charge was groundless. 
Aplt. Br. at 24-28. In other words, defendant interprets the interference statute as 
providing that, where an officer's order violates a constitutional or statutory provision 
such as the Fourth Amendment, a citizen is free to ignore or actively resist the order or 
assault the officer without fear of prosecution. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the controlling issue here is not whether the 
attempted frisk was justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant was potentially 
dangerous, but whether the officers were acting within the scope of their authority. 
was in danger.'" State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 
27)). 
The attempted protective frisk here was warranted. Upon responding to a dispatch 
report of a man hassling customers at the Circle K store in the middle of the night, Officer 
Dobrowolski observed defendant's intoxicated state and belligerent behavior (R. 166:34-
35, 46-49. Moreover, the first officer on the scene reported that defendant was 
uncooperative or "trying to talk his way into jail" (R. 166:48). Finally, in Officer 
Dobrowolski's experience intoxicated individuals "can behave unpredictably"and 
"violently" (R. 166:33). The trial court found that the attempted protective frisk was 
reasonable (R. 110-113), add. A, and that well supported ruling should be upheld. See 
United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding protective frisk 
of intoxicated defendant who backed away as police approached at night in a high crime 
area; specifically noting that defendant's backward step was reasonably construed as a 
hostile action, i.e., "gaining room to use a weapon"). 
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A. State v. Gardiner and Progeny are Dispositive 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 569-570 (Utah 1991), involved a defendant's 
resistance of an officer's efforts to arrest him following the officer's attempt to conduct 
what was later found to be an illegal search. The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the law 
in this jurisdiction, determined that there was no common law right to resist an illegal 
arrest and no right to resist under the interference with an officer statute, and affirmed 
defendant's conviction for interfering with an officer. Id at 574-76. 
The officer in Gardiner arrived at a business location to investigate a party and 
met Gardiner at the door. Id at 569. The officer stated that he intended to check the 
building for minors, and, when he could not produce the search warrant demanded by 
Gardiner, Gardiner aggressively blocked his entrance. Id The officer pushed Gardiner, 
who responded by punching the officer in the face. Id A fight ensured and, during the 
struggle, the officer informed Gardiner that he was under arrest. Id However, Gardiner 
refused to stop fighting and again attacked the officer. Id Gardiner was convicted of 
assault on a peace officer and interference with a peace officer under Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-5-102.4 and 76-8-305 (1990). Id. at 569-70. The Utah Supreme Court found that, 
regardless of the illegality of the officer's attempt to conduct a warrantless search of the 
premises, Gardiner committed the charged crimes when he physically fought with the 
officer before and during the officer's attempt to place him under arrest. Id at 574-75. 
The supreme court rejected defendant's attempts to justify his actions against the officer, 
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finding no basis in either statute to justify Gardiner's resistance to the illegal search or to 
the officer's subsequent efforts to arrest him. Id See also J.H. By and Through D.H. v. 
West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115, 125 n.38 (Utah 1992) (recognizing that Gardiner 
requires "a citizen faced with illegal police action to submit to the action or face potential 
criminal penalties if the action of the police officer is later found to be within the scope of 
his authority"). 
After the offenses in Gardiner were committed, the interference with an officer 
statute was amended. Defendant in this case was charged under a new subsection which 
provides: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or 
by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace 
officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or 
another and interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act 
required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the 
arrest or detention 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (1995). Defendant contends that the addition of the 
requirement of a "lawful order" in the interference statute requires that the State establish 
the legality of the underlying attempted protective frisk before defendant's subsequent 
resistance to the officer's orders will violate the statute. Aplt. Br. at 24-26. 
This Court rejected a similar argument in Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003 
(Utah App. 1996). Smoot was convicted of, among other things, interfering with an 
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officer as set forth in the Salt Lake City ordinances. The ordinance includes three 
sections, one of which requires a "lawful command of a police officer[.]"4 Id at 1010-
1011. This Court found it unnecessary to distinguish between the sections in order to 
interpret them. Id at 1011, n.8. Relying on Gardiner, this Court noted that any right to 
resist must be found in the charging statutes, then found that the inquiry relevant to the 
charged ordinance was whether the officers were acting within the scope of their 
authority. Id at 1010. 
The same inquiry, therefore, applies in the context of the amended interference 
statute. To determine whether an officer acted within the scope of his authority, this 
Court in Smoot, looked to "objective indicia of how the officer is perceived." Id This 
includes such facts as "whether or not the officer was in uniform and on duty, whether the 
defendant knew he or she was an officer, and whether the defendant knew he or she was 
4The charged ordinance provided, in relevant part: 
Every person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor who: 
A. Attempts by means of any threat, force or violence to deter, interfere 
with or prevent a police officer... from performing any official duty 
imposed upon such officer . . . by law; or 
B. Wilfully resists, physically delays or physically obstructs a police officer 
. . . or fails to comply with a lawful command of a police officer . . . in the 
discharge or attempt to discharge any official duty of such officer; or 
C. Knowingly resists by the use of force or violence any police officer . . . . while 
performing an official duty. 
Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1010, 1011 (quoting Salt Lake City Code section 11.04.030) 
(emphasis added). 
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being arrested." Id. Where the relevant objective indicia are present and suggest that the 
officer is acting within the scope of his or her authority, no right to resist exists. Id. This 
is so even where the officers are acting without a legal ground, because the illegality of an 
officer's action does not justify a defendant's resistance. Id.; see also Gardiner, 814 P.2d 
at 574. Accordingly, in this case, defendant's narrow interpretation of the requirement 
that the officer's actions be "lawful" must be rejected in favor of the broader 
interpretation called for in Gardiner and Smoot - - in determining whether defendant's 
conduct violated the interference statute, Officer Dobrowolski's orders must be "lawful" 
in the sense that the objective indicia provide the perception that the officer was acting 
within the scope of his authority, thus giving defendant no right to resist or interfere. 
B. An Order to Submit to a Protective Frisk is Necessarily 
Within the Scope of a Peace Officer's Authority 
While defendant contests the basis for the protective frisk, he makes no claim that 
Officer Dobrowolski acted outside the scope of his authority as a police officer. Aplt. 
Br.24-26. Nor does he claim that he was unaware that either Officer Bushman, the first 
officer on the scene, or Officer Dobrowolski, who ultimately ordered the protective frisk, 
were Salt Lake City Police Officers called to investigate the Circle K clerk's complaint. 
See Aplt. Br. at 18-35. Indeed, defendant knew from his initial conversation with Officer 
Bushman that police wanted to identify him and to speak with him further about the 
dispatch report that he was harassing Circle K customers (R. Il l) {see also R. 166:7-8). 
Further, Officer Dobrowolski's order that defendant place his hands on his head in 
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preparation for a protective frisk was objectively designed to accomplish, without 
unnecessary force, a safe environment in which to further investigate the Circle K 
complaint (R. 112-113). These circumstances objectively establish that both officers 
were acting within the scope of their authority as peace officers - - giving defendant no 
basis upon which to resist or disobey - - and should render Officer Dobrowolski's orders 
"lawful" within the meaning of the interference statute. Cf. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574-
75; Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1010-1011. This is so even if the protective frisk is ultimately 
found to be have been unwarranted. See Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574. 
This interpretation finds support in public policy as well. Defendant's position 
would permit him to do any criminal act during or after a police illegality, so long as it is 
connected in some form to the chain of events started by the police misconduct, yet 
escape liability for interference with an officer. For example, defendant's position, as a 
matter of public policy, would permit a suspect to actively resist and/or physically disrupt 
a search using any force available as long as the search warrant was ultimately found to 
be defective. This very approach was rejected in Gardiner. 
Moreover, use of a broad interpretation of the "lawful" requirement does not rob 
defendant of his ability to challenge the strict legality of Officer Dobrowolski's order that 
he submit to a protective frisk. It simply requires that he do so within the confines of the 
judicial system at a later point and accept the appropriate legal remedy instead of 
employing a self help remedy. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 572. Defendant's narrow 
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interpretation would permit a defendant to make his own determination in the heat of the 
moment as to the constitutional or statutory legality of the officer's actions and — if he 
guesses right — to disobey or resist police. This is contrary to the Utah Supreme 
Court's declaration that "questions] of legality must be determined in subsequent judicial 
proceedings, not in the street." Id at 574. As the Utah Supreme Court recognized, in 
today's world, individuals may legally challenge perceived illegalities in the actions of 
officers and, if any are found, may pursue the appropriate remedy in the courts. Id at 
572. 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant nominally claims that Gardiner and its 
progeny are inapplicable here on the ground that the defendants in Gardiner, Smoot and 
State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1997), "had all unquestionably violated the 
interference statute for resisting a lawful arrest." Aplt. Br. at 26 (citing Gardiner, 814 
P.2d at 575; Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1011-12; Griego, 933 P.2d at 1009). Their distinction is 
inconsequential. The supreme court and this Court clearly rejected all three defendants' 
claims that a police illegality justified their resistance and/or intervening crimes. See 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574-75; Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1010-1-12; Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008-
009. Although the analytical paths in Gardiner, Smoot, and Griego vary, the consistent 
rule to be gleaned from them is that so long as a peace officer is acting within the scope 
of his authority, even an unwarranted order must be obeyed, and such cannot be used as a 
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ground to escape punishment for a simultaneous and/or intervening crime.5 Id 
Significantly, defendant points to nothing in the reasoning of Gardiner, Smoot or Griego, 
which reasonably suggests the results in these cases would have been different if the 
arrests had been ^questionably invalid. Aplt. Br. at 26. Indeed, as noted previously, this 
Court expressly recognized that even assuming the arrest in Smoot was invalid, Smoot 
"still would not have been justified in resisting arrest" under Gardiner. Smoot 921 P.2d 
at 1010, (citing Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574). See also Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008 (assuming 
warrantless entry was illegal for purposes of analysis). 
C. Defendant's Arrest Was Also Justified Based on His 
Obvious Public Intoxication 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Officer Dobrowolski acted outside the scope of his 
authority in ordering the protective frisk which defendant resisted, defendant's arrest was 
nonetheless valid on the alternative ground that there was probable cause to believe he 
was publicly intoxicated. In Point 11(B) of his brief, defendant claims that police lacked 
probable cause to arrest him for public intoxication and therefore his arrest and the search 
incident thereto cannot be justified on this alternative ground.6 Aplt. Br. at 27-31. The 
5
 Griego does not focus on the "scope of authority" analysis in Gardiner and 
Smoot, but on another line of authority recognizing that "[a]n illegal entry or prior 
illegality by officers does not affect the subsequent arrest of a defendant where there is an 
intervening illegal act by the suspect." Id. (citing State v. Wagstaff, 846 P.2d 1311 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
6In Point 11(C) of his brief, defendant also claims that police lacked probable cause 
to arrest him for disorderly conduct and therefore his arrest and the search incident cannot 
be justified on this alternative ground either. See Aplt. Br. at 28-35. However, defendant 
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trial court found that there was probable cause, or at least "close to probable cause to 
arrest defendant for public intoxication" (R. 113), add. A. 
The trial court's finding of probable cause to arrest for public intoxication is well 
supported in the record (R. 110-112), add. A, (see R. 166:3-9, 11, 22, 26, 33-35, 46-51). 
Indeed, in challenging the trial court's finding of probable cause to arrest for public 
intoxication defendant fails to demonstrate any clear error. See State v. Moosman, 19A 
P.2d 474, 475 (Utah 1990); State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 735 (Utah App. 1991), cert 
denied, 836 P2d 1383 (Utah 1991). To show clear error in the trial court's factual 
findings, defendant must "marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court' s 
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack." 
Moosman, 794 P.2d at 476. 
Here, defendant cites only favorable evidence and inferences, wholly failing to 
marshal evidence supportive of the trial court's probable cause ruling. Aplt. Br. at 27-28. 
was not ultimately charged with disorderly conduct (R. 17-19); moreover, the trial court 
effectively found that defendant did not commit disorderly conduct until after he was 
arrested (R. 110-113), add. A. Defendant's pre-arrest resistance therefore provided no 
independent or intervening basis for the arrest (id.). Accordingly, defendant's claims 
regarding probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct on appeal are based on a false 
premise that the legality of the attempted frisk defendant resisted controls, whereas under 
Gardiner, the controlling fact is that the officer was acting within the scope of his 
authority, a conclusion that defendant does not contest. See Aplt. Br. at 18-41. For these 
reasons, defendant's claims regarding probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct on 
appeal are irrelevant, including his challenge to the constitutionality of the disorderly 
conduct statute, see Point 11(D), and they are not further addressed here. 
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For example, he fails to acknowledge that Officer Dobrowolski responded to a complaint 
that defendant was harassing Circle K customers (R. 166:34). Nor does defendant 
acknowledge that Officer Dobrowolski observed defendant's belligerent and intoxicated 
behavior with Officer Bushman, and also experienced it himself in attempting the 
protective frisk (R. 166:31-51). Moreover, as noted previously, Officer Dobrowolski 
reasonably relied on information from Officer Bushman that defendant had been 
uncooperative with him (R. 166:34-35). See State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 142 
(Utah App. 1997). Finally, defendant ignores the fact that the intoxication statute applies 
not only if the intoxicated actor is dangerous, but also "unreasonably disturbs other 
people." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-701(1) (1999). Given the deficient challenge, 
defendant fails to demonstrate any clear error in the trial court's factual findings in 
support of the ultimate determination of probable cause to arrest for public intoxication 
(R. 110-113), add. A. See State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994) (recognizing 
that a trial court's legal conclusion of probable cause is afforded a "measure of 
discretion"). His claim should therefore be rejected. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchg., 
817 P.2d 800, 801 (Utah 1991) (failure to comply with marshaling requirement is alone 
grounds to reject challenge to trial court ruling). 
In sum, defendant's arrest was justified based on his interference with a lawful 
order to submit to a protective frisk, and/or his obvious public intoxication. Therefore, 
the search of his person incident to the arrest was justified and the cocaine discovered as a 
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result was properly seized. The trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress should 
be upheld.7 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's guilty plea to possession of cocaine, a third degree felony should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on^2?August 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
7In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court should have 
suppressed the rock cocaine seized from his person because it was the fruit of 
unattenuated illegal police conduct. Aplt. Br. at 35 (citing e.g.9 Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). The 
trial court found no illegality in officers' actions and thus did not engage in an attenuation 
analysis. As stated in the body of this point, regardless of the validity of the attempted 
frisk, defendant was going to be arrested and searched incident thereto for at least the 
suspected public intoxication offense. He thus fails to demonstrate that an attenuation 
analysis is applicable on these facts. Therefore, neither the State nor the Court need 
engage in an attenuation analysis here. 
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DAVID S. KOTTLER (6592) 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JACK JAMES TRANE, ] 
Defendant ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Case No. 981923959 
i Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came before this Court on March 1,1999 at 1:30 P.M. 
Defendant was present and represented by David S. Kottler and the State of Utah was 
represented by Jennifer D. Barton, Deputy District Attorney. Both parties briefed the issues prior 
to hearing. Evidence was taken at the hearing in the form of testimony by Officers Dobrowolski 
and Bushman. 
Findings of Fact 
1. Officer Walter Dobrowolski and Officer Randy Bushman are police officers with 
Salt Lake City Police Department Both have been police officers for approximately eight years. 
Both officers currently work the "graveyard shift," from 10:00 P.M. to 8:00 A.M. 
2. Officers Dobrowolski and Bushman have had specific training in the symptoms 
RUBBISTMCTC^i 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 1 1999 
associated with drug and alcohol use. Both officers have dealt with intoxicated citizens several 
times each week for their entire careers. 
3. Based on their training and experience, Officers Dobrowolski and Bushman 
believe that intoxicated persons can behave unpredictably and sometimes violently. Both are 
concerned for public and officer safety when dealing with intoxicants, 
4. On November 26,1998 at about 4:12 A.M. Officers Dobrowolski and Bushman 
received information that a man, later identified as the defendant, was harassing customers at the 
Circle K convenience store located at 710 E. 2700 S., Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. Officer Bushman arrived at the Circle K minutes before Officer Dobrowolski and 
identified the defendant as a suspect in the disturbance complaint. 
6. The defendant was uncooperative, belligerent, and loud. The defendant was using 
vulgar language, smelled of alcohol, took a fighting stance toward Officer Bushman, and 
appeared angry. 
7. Officer Dobrowolski arrived and spoke with Officer Bushman. Officer Bushman 
told Officer Dobrowolski that the defendant was "trying to talk his way into jail." 
8. Officer Dobrowolski approached the defendant and detected an odor of alcohol, 
and noticed that the defendant was swaying slightly. Officer Dobrowolski believed the 
defendant was intoxicated 
9. Officer Dobrowolski ordered the defendant to put his hands on his head and 
interlock his fingers so that Officer Dobrowolski could search him. Officer Dombrowski 
repeated the command two more times and each time the defendant refused. 
10. Officer Dobrowolski told the defendant he was now under arrest and told the 
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defendant to put his hands behind his back. The defendant refused. 
11. Although the defendant had not been cooperative with Officers Bushman and 
Dobrowolski, he had not been verbally or physically threatening toward them prior to being 
placed under arrest. Any physical resistance by the defendant, if it occurred at all, did not occur 
until after the defendant had been arrested 
12. The defendant was eventually handcuffed and transported to jail, where jail 
personnel searched him and located suspected controlled substances in the defendant's shoe. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The initial detention of the defendant was proper and supported by Officer 
Bushman's reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or was about to 
occur. 
2. Officer Bushman's reasonable articulable suspicion was created by the 
information he had received from dispatch regarding the defendant harassing customers, and also 
by his observations at the scene. Officer Bushman's observations included the defendant's angry 
demeanor, the odor of alcohol, the defendant's loud tone of voice, his refusal to cooperate, his 
use of vulgar language, his assumption of a fighting stance, and his unsteady balance. 
3. The "Terry frisk" of the defendant was proper and supported by Officer 
Dobrowolski's reasonable concern for his safety. 
4. Officer Dobrowolski's concern was created by his observations that defendant 
appeared intoxicated, that he was uncooperative, belligerent, loud, and appeared angry. In 
addition, the officer's concern for his safety was reasonable in light of the early morning hour, 
the comment that Officer Bushman had made to him regarding the defendant "trying to talk his 
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way into jail," and Officer Dobrowolski's experience with intoxicants as a police officer. 
5. The defendant's arrest was proper and justified by the defendant's refusal to 
comply with Officer Dobrowolski's lawful command to submit to a search. In addition, Officer 
Dobrowolski had, if not probable cause, then close to probable cause to arrest the defendant for 
public intoxication. 
6. Because any physical resistance by the defendant did not occur until after he was 
arrested, whatever physical resistance did occur, if any, cannot provide an independent basis for 
the arrest. 
7. The subsequent jailhouse search of the defendant is justified and proper as a 
search incident to his arrest. 
DATED this £ / day o fO*^gJ999 . 
BY THE COURT: 
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COMES NOW s ) « t > T ') r, _, the defendant in this case, and hereby 
acknowledges and certifies the following: 
COMPARECE _, el acusado en este caso, y por este medio 
reconoce y certifica lo siguiente: 
I am entering a pica of guilty to the following crime(s): 
Me declaro culpable del siguiente delito(s): 
CRJMEft STATUTORY 
PROVISION 




















I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature 
and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading guilty. 
He recibido una copia del Documento Acusatono, la he leido, y entiendo la naturaleza y los elementos 
del delito(s) por el cual me declaro culpable. 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: 
Los elementos del delito(s) del cual se me acusa son los siguientes: 
^ ^ v y , ^ ^ ay^^ , ^  U ^ k c v ^ ' i y Jo S<L*-S V^r-
My conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable that constitutes 
the elements of the crime(s) charged is as follows: 
Mi conductay la conducta de otras personas por la cual soy penalmente responsable, y que constituye 
los elementos del delito(s) imputado, es la siguiente: 
Q-* T^« V ^ — W < ?•( „ r ? ? # ft III-- « < r*-*J*-<*/ ^ 
i *<s go,sf . ^ w ^ ~ty*-n <*~°^^ 
/ 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the 
following facts: 
Doy entrada a esta declaraci6n(es) voluntariamente y con el conocimiento y el entendimiento de la 
siguiente information: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, 
an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no coat to me. I recognize that a condition of my sentence 
may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the Court, to recoup the coat of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
1. Se que tengo el derecho a ser representado por un abogado, y a 
uno, el tribunal me asignariun abogado sin cobrarme. Reconozco que una condicion de mi pena puede ser que 
se me requiera pagar una cantidad, determinada por el tribunal, para reembolsar el costo del abogado, si es que 
se me asignara uno. 
2. I Qiavejrot) (have) waived my right to counsel If I have waived my right to counsel, I have 
done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
2. (No he) (he) renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado. Si he renunciado al derecho a tener un 
abogado, lo he hecho a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente por las siguientes razones: 
[\<: 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and understand the nature 
and dements of the charges, my rights in this case and other proceedings, and the consequences of my 
plea of guilty. 
3. Si he rcnunciado al derecho a tener un abogado, he ltido este documento y entiendo la naturaleza 
y los elementos de los cargos, mis derechos en este caso y otros actos procesales, y las consecuencias de mi 
declaration de culpabilidad. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is | ) ft-*/ ^ < V-^ rT^JrJtnd I 
have had an opportunity to fully discuss this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty 
plea with my attorney. 
4. Si no he renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado, mi abogado es , 
y he tenido la oportimidad de hablar con mi abogado en detalle sobre este documento, mis derechos y las 
consecuencias de mi declaration de culpabilidad. 
5. I know that I have a right to a speedy trial in open court by an impartial jury and that I am 
giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
5. Si que tengo el derecho a tener un juicio publico sin demora ante un jurado impartial, y que al 
declararme culpable renuntio a ese derecho. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to compd 
my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court in my behalf. I understand that I am 
giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
6. Se que si deseo tener un juicio, tengo el derecho a carear y repreguntar a los testigos en mi contra, 
o hacer que mi abogado les repregunte. Tambien si que tengo el derecho a obligar a mis testigo(s), por medio 
de uncitatorio costeadopor el Estado, a testificar a mi favor en el tribunal Entiendo que al declararme culpable 
renuntio a estos derechos. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf; bnt if I choose not to do so, I cannot 
be compdled to testify or give evidence against myself; and no adverse inferences will be drawn against 
me if I do not testify. I understand that I am giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
7. Si que tengo el derecho a testificar ami favor, pero si elijo no hacerlo, no seme puede obligar 
a testificar o a dar pruebas en mi contra, y ninguna inf crentiadesfevorablesesacaracnmicontrasinotcstifico. 
Entiendo que al declararme culpable renuntio a estos derechos. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and the 
matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each element 
of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
8. Se que si deseo disputar la acusacion, solo necesito declararme inocente y el asunto se fijara para 
un juicio. En el juicio el Estado de Utah tendra la obligation de probar cada elemento de la acusacion sin que 
quepa duda razonable. Si el juicio es ante un jurado, el veredicto tiene que ser unanime. 
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9. I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the right of a presumption of innocence. I 
understand that I am presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if 
this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead guilty. I understand that I give up the right to the presumption 
of innocence if I plead guilty. 
9. Entiendo que como acusado gozo del derecho a la presuncion de inocencia. Entiendo que se supone 
que soy inocente hasta que el Estado pruebe en un juicio ante un jurado que soy culpable sin que quepa duda 
razonable, o hasta que me declare culpable si decido no tener un juicio. Entiendo que renuncio al derecho a la 
presuncion de inocencia si me declaro culpable. 
10. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the 
Judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, 
where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, 
those costs would be paid by the State. L understand that I am giving up thm rights if I plead guilty.. 
10. Se que bajo la Constitucion de Utah, si el jurado o el Juez me enjuiciara y condenara, tendria el 
derecho a apelar mi condena y pena en la Corte de Apelaciones de Utah o, donde se permita, en la Corte 
Suprema de Utah, y si no tuviera los fondos para pagar por los gastos de tal apelacion, esos gastos los pagaria 
el Estado. Entiendo que renuncio a estos derechos si me declaro culpable. 
11. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which I plead guilty. 
I know that by pleading guilty to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence, I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentence 
may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine, an 
eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to 
make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges 
that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this plea agreement 
11. Sc cual es la pena maxima que se puede imponer por cada delito por el cual me declaro culpable. 
Se que al declararme culpable de un delito que lleva una pena minima obligatoria, me estare sometiendo a 
cumplir esa pena minima obligatoria por ese delito. Se que las penas pueden ser consecutivas y pueden consists 
en una condena penitenciaria, una multa, o ambas. Si que ademas de una multa, se impondra un recargo de 
ochenta y cinco por ciento (85%). Tambien se que el Juez me puede ordenar indemnizar a cualquier victima(s) 
de mis delitos, incluyendo cualquier restitution que se deba en los cargos retirados como resultado de este 
convenio declaratorio, si estos existieran. 
12. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for an additional 
amount if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my 
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. Se que el encarcelamiento puede ser por periodos consecutivos, o la multa en una cantidad 
adicional, si me declaro culpable de mis de un delito. Tambien si que si estoy bajo libertad condicional 
probatoria ("probation"), o libertad preparatoria ("parole"), o esperando la imposition de la pena por otro delito 
del cual he sido condenado o por el cual me he declarado culpable, mi declaracidndeculpabilidadenlapresente 
action puede resultar en que se me impongan penas consecutivas. 
13. I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up my statutory 
and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such plea(s), 
I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the 
crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered. 
13. Se y entiendo que al declaranne culpable renuncio a los derechos legates y constitucionales 
enumerados en los parrafos anteriores. Tambien se que al dar entrada a tal declaracion(es), admito que he 
cometido la conducta que se alega y que soy culpable del delito(s) por el cual se da entrada a mi declaracion(es). 
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14. My plea(s) of guilty (»9) (is not) the result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
prosecuting attorney. The promise^ duties, and provisions of thb plea bargain, if any, are fiiliy 
contained in this statement. 
14 Mi declaracion de culpabilidad (es) (no es) el resultado de un convemo declaratono entre el 
abogado acusador y yo Las promesas, obkgactones y estipulaciones de este convemo declaratono, si existen 
algunas, se encuentran en su totalidad en este documento. 
15. I know and understand that any motion to withdraw my plea(s) of guilty must be for good 
cause, in writing, and must be filed within thirty (30) days after entry of my guilty plea. 
15 Se y entiendo que cualquier peticidn para retirar mi declaracion(es) de culpabilidad ha de 
mterponerse dentro de trernta (30) dias despues de dar entrada a dicha declaracion(es), y esto ha de ser por 
escnto, y debe existir causa justificada. 
16. I know that any charge or sentencing concession, or recommendation of probation or 
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney, is not binding on the Judge. I also know that any opinions 
they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court 
16. Se que el Juez no aene que regirse por cualquier concesidn de cargo o de pena, o recomendacion 
de libcrtad condicional probatona o pena suspendida, mcluyendo una reduccion de los cargos para la imposicion 
de la pena hecha o sokcitada por el abogado defensor o el abogado acusador. Tambien se que el Juez tampoco 
tiene que regirse por cualquier opinion que me expresen en cuanto a lo que ellos crean que pueda hacer el Juez. 
17. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind has been made to induce me to plead 
guilty, and no promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
17 No se me ha amenazado, coaccionado, o mftwcnaarto ilegahnente para inducinne a declaranne 
culpable, y no se me ha hecho mnguna promesa excepto las contenidas en este documento. 
18. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand 
its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement I do not 
wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct 
18 He leido este documento, o mi abogado me lo ha lddo, y entiendo sus estipulaciones. Se que 
puedo cambiar o tachar cualquier cosa contemda en este documento. No deseo hacer mngun cambio porquc 
todas las afirmaciones son correctas. 
19. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
19. Estoy satisfecho con cl ascsoramiento y U ayuda de mi abogado. 
20. I am J / years of age; I have attended school through the 1 ^ g r a d e : and I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided 
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my 
judgment when the decision was made to enter the piea(s). I am not presently under the influence of any 
drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment 
20 Tengo alios de edad, he asistido a la escuda hasta el grado y puedo leer y entender 
cspafiol. Si no entiendo ingles, se me ha proporcionado un inrtrprete. No estaba bajo la influencia de mnguna 
droga, medicamento o bebida alcohdlica que pudiera perjudicar mi critcrio cuando se tomo la decision de dar 
entrada a la declaracion(es) Actualmente no estoy bajo la influencia de ninguna droga, medicamento o bebida 
alcoholica que pequdique mi cnteno. 
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21. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind; mentally capable of understanding the 
proceedings and the consequences of my plea; and free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that 
would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
21. Creo estar en sano juicio, con capacidad mental de entender los actos procesales y las 
consecuencias de mi declaracion, y libre de cualquier enfennedad mental, defecto o impedimento que me 
previniera dar entrada a mi declaracion a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente. 
22. Other: 
22. Anadido: 
a. C <JVt C <ws/^ r^L •re\_A (Tvl 
u. f ( ft La-<? t&H. ^ f>rt 
Cpjy^^O +k«\ 
_^j ( y*\ \ f -ix£2- Is. 
c,.y^,^^XQ^X Ako T\^J[ 3& ' I t * . ! -£ *&=^- ^ *JL 
, u &{-' UJL ck u - e 0 - k I ")H~« C^uid o f 0 '~*l<?c±JyCfi^x 
Dated this <* f day of xz-ygjuUL _ 1999. 
Fechado el dia del mes de del999. 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO DEFENSOR 
I certify that I am the attorney for ^ A , O V - J r^^ju _, the defendant above, and 
that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; and I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; 
and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing 
affidavit, are accurate and true. 
Certifico que soy el abogado de , el antedicho acusado(a), y se 
que el (ella) ha lcido el documento, o que se lo he leido yo, y lo he discutido con 61 (ella), y creo que entiende 
el significado del contenido en su totalidad, y creo que esti mental y fisicamente competente. A mi leal saber 
y entender, despues de una investigacidn apropiada, los elementos del delito(s) y la sinopsis factual de la 
conducta delictiva del acusado estan estipulados correctamente, y estos, junto con las otras proclamaciones y 
afirmaciones hechas por el acusado en el affidavit anterior, son certeros y verdaderos. 
U p i C1AC 
Attorp^y for Defendant / Bar No. 
El bogado del Acusado / N° de Abogacia 
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO ACUSADOR 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
defendant I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's 
criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, 
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court 
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for 
the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the 
public interest 
Certifico que soy el abogado del Estado de Utah en la causa en contra de , 
el acusado. He revisado este Documento Declaratono del Acusado y encuentro que la base factual de la 
conduct* delictiva del acusado que constituye el delito es verdadera y correcta. No se le ha ofrecido al acusado 
ningun inccntivo inapropiado, amenaza o coaccion para alentar una declaration de culpabilidad. Las 
negociaciones declaratohas se encuentran en su totalidad en el Documento y en el Convenio Declaratono, o 
como complemento en las actas del tribunal. Existe motivo fimdado para creer que la prueba respaldaria la 
condena del acusado por el delito(s) ante el cual se da entrada a la declaracion(es), y la aceptacion de esta 
dcclaracion(es) beneficiaria a la ciudadania. 
&M 
Prosecuting Attorney / Bar No-
El Abogado Acusador / N° de Abogacia 
ORDER 
LAORDENDELJUEZ 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and 
counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is freely and 
voluntarily made, and it b so ordered that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty to the charges) set forth in 
the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Basado en los hechos presentados en el Documento anterior y la certification del acusado y de los 
abogados, el Juez atcstigua las finnas y detennma que la declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad del acusado se hace 
libre y voluntariamente, y asi se ordena que la declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad del acusado por el cargo(s) 
expuesto en el Documento sea aceptada y asentada. 
Dated this Zs( day of ^ ^ » ^ e ^ . 1999. 
Fechadoeldia de de 1999. 
DKTRIi 
EUUEZ 
*Z~^At< Juli 4a. 
IS ICT COURT JUDGE 
DEL TRIBUNAL DEL tf 
v*s.v *»Kc 
